When purchasing products, consumers often need to decide on the highest price they are willing to pay (WTP) and, when selling products, on the lowest price they are willing to accept (WTA) . In this research, we contrast the determinants of WTP and WTA judgments and investigate their susceptibility to influence by arbitrary anchors that are unrelated to the product value. Consistent with our analysis, we demonstrate in a series of studies that purchase, but not selling, prices are influenced by arbitrary anchors (e.g., the last two digits of the person's social security number), even when such anchors are rejected as possible purchase/selling prices. Conversely, selling, but not purchase, prices are influenced by arbitrary anchors relating to the perceived market price of the product.
The results also indicate that selling prices become sensitive to arbitrary anchors that are considered as possible prices, if the uncertainty about the value of the product to the consumer is made salient. We discuss the implications of these findings with respect to our understanding of the determinants of consumers' willingness-to-pay and willingnessto-accept, value-based pricing, and the anchoring effect.
How do consumers decide on the highest price they are willing to pay for a desired product? And, how do they decide on the lowest price they are willing to accept for a product they wish to sell? The former question, which relates to the economic concept of reservation price, has been studied extensively in both marketing and economics (for a review, see Monroe 1990) . Prior research has identified a variety of factors that influence price perceptions, including factors that affect the assessment of the perceived value of the product to the consumer and, relatedly, the reference prices used to evaluate the attractiveness of a given price (e.g., Winer 1986) . Although the determinants of reservation prices have been extensively studied, there has been very little research (e.g., Carmon and Ariely 2000) regarding the manner in which consumers decide on the lowest price they are willing to accept for a product, for example when they wish to sell used products or unwanted gifts.
In this research, we contrast the role of perceived value and reference market prices in buying and selling decisions. We argue that perceived value plays a relatively greater role when setting the maximum purchase price whereas reference market prices have greater impact when deciding on the minimum selling price. Accordingly, it is proposed that reservation prices (i.e., the highest willingness-to-pay), which often depend on fuzzy and malleable preferences (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998) , can be manipulated by causing consumers to consider specific candidate prices, even when such prices are clearly arbitrary. Conversely, minimum selling prices are most susceptible to influence by factors that affect the perceived market prices of the product they wish to sell.
We investigate this proposition using an anchoring procedure whereby consumers first assess whether they are willing to buy [sell] a certain product at an arbitrary price, and then indicate the price at which they would be willing to buy [sell] that product (see, e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2002; Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) . We employ a similar procedure with respect to perceived market prices, whereby consumers are asked whether the typical store price is higher or lower than a given arbitrary number, followed by an estimate of the typical store price. Our investigation also provides insights into the process by which the maximum willingnessto-pay (WTP) and the minimum willingness-to-accept (WTA) are determined. We discuss the implications of this research with respect to value-based pricing and our understanding of the anchoring effect.
CONSUMERS' ASSESSMENTS OF BUYING AND SELLING PRICES
The price that consumers are willing to pay reflects both the value of the product (or service) to the consumer and the sacrifice involved in acquiring the product. It has been suggested that consumers first judge the value of an offer and then decide whether to purchase the item (Monroe 1990, pages 73-4) . The assessment of value consists of the product's acquisition value, which is based on the ratio of the product's perceived benefits to the perceived sacrifice, and the transaction value (Thaler 1985) , which depends on the perceived gains or losses relative to reference prices.
Prior research indicates that reference prices can be influenced by a variety of factors, such as prices previously encountered (e.g., Della Bitta and Monroe 1974) and comparative price advertisements (e.g., Blair and Landon 1981; Della Bitta, Monroe, and McGinnis 1981) . Thus, the assessment of prices depends both on the perceived benefits of the product and the perceived attractiveness of the price relative to reference prices.
The former factor depends on the consumer's tastes and the assessment of the utility of the product. The latter factor depends on the relevant reference points, which might include stored reference prices (i.e., an internal reference point constructed based on prior price exposure) and external reference prices (e.g., an advertised list price).
Prior research also suggests that both plausible and implausible anchors can influence reference prices (e.g., Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; Urbany, Bearden, and Weilbaker 1988) . That is, when assessing the acquisition value of an item, a consumer might be influenced by an advertised reference price even if that price is perceived as implausible. For example, an ad for a Buick car might use the price of a Mercedes car as a high reference point. In that case, although the consumer might dismiss the Mercedes price as a comparable reference point, the high price of the Mercedes could increase the internal reference price used for assessing the price of the Buick.
Additionally, research on price perception and the construction of preferences (for a review, see, e.g., Bettman et al. 1998) suggests that, contrary to the assumptions of classical economic theory, individuals often do not hold well-defined values. Therefore, consumers may susceptible to seemingly irrelevant influences when assessing product benefits and value. For example, Simonson and Tversky (1992) asked one group of consumers to choose between $6 and an elegant Cross pen. A second group was asked to choose among $6, the same Cross pen, and a second pen that was clearly less attractive.
The results indicated that, although very few chose the less attractive pen, its inclusion in the set increased the share of consumers who chose the Cross pen over the $6. These results are consistent with the notion that consumers do not have an accurate assessment of the value of a Cross pen to them and instead rely on comparisons among the presented alternatives in order to evaluate the attractiveness of each option. In addition to such influences of choice context, studies have demonstrated the impact of product description (e.g., Bettman and Kakkar 1977; Levin and Gaeth 1988) as well as the preference elicitation task (e.g., Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Fisher, Carmon, Ariely, and Zauberman 1999) .
Since consumers are typically buyers rather than sellers, except for studies relating to the endowment effect (e.g., Carmon and Ariely 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) , almost all consumer pricing research has focused on the assessment of price from the point of view of buyers. However, consumers often also act as sellers, for example, when selling used products or unwanted gifts. The amount of selling by ordinary consumers has significantly increased in recent years as new channels, such as online auctions (e.g., eBay), have become more popular and accessible to nonprofessional sellers. Like purchase prices, the perception of selling prices is likely to depend on the value of the item to the consumer (i.e., the seller) and the relevant market prices of similar or related goods. Yet, the relative weight of the value of the item to the consumer, compared to the weight of market prices, is expected to be lower in selling versus purchase decisions. As argued below, this difference between purchase and selling prices makes the former more susceptible to arbitrary influences (e.g., anchoring on irrelevant values) that relate directly to the willingness-to-pay (WTP), whereas selling prices are more likely to be influenced by manipulations of perceived market prices.
Next, we review the concept of, and prior research on, anchoring effects and explore their implications for consumer willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept judgments. Kahneman (1974, p. 1128 ) described anchoring as a process in which "people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield a final answer … adjustments are typically insufficient." Since then there have been many demonstrations of anchoring effects, and several explanations for such effects have been proposed (for a recent review, see Chapman and Johnson 2002) . In a typical demonstration of anchoring, respondents are asked to estimate a certain value, such as the percentage of African countries in the United Nations. They are given an arbitrary value, such 20% or 80%, and then asked if the actual percentage is higher or lower than that number. They are told to provide their best estimate, and the typical finding is that these estimates are significantly influenced by the anchor (e.g., Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995) .
ANCHORING EFFECTS ON PRICE JUDGMENTS
For example, Green et al. (1998) showed an anchoring effect on judgments of willingness-to-pay for public goods. In many anchoring studies, the provided anchor is clearly arbitrary and uninformative, such as using a wheel of fortune to generate the anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) or asking respondents to consider as a possible value the first three digits of their social security number (Ariely et al., in press).
The original explanation of the "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) was based on the notion that, in developing their final estimate, decision makers adjust the considered anchor, but these adjustments tend to be insufficient. Consistent with the notion of anchoring and insufficient adjustment, Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) suggested that judges who are first asked to determine whether a target value is higher or lower than a given anchor adjust their estimates in the appropriate direction until an acceptable value is found. Since this adjustment process terminates at the nearest upper or lower boundary of a large range of acceptable values, it tends to be insufficient. Recent research by Epley and Gilovich (2001) provides further support for this explanation, showing that when anchors are self-generated, a process of anchoring and insufficient adjustments accounts for the observed effects.
A second explanation has focused on the effort involved in making adjustments from an anchor. According to this explanation, insufficient adjustments reflect the tendency of people to minimize cognitive effort. In support of this account, Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988) and Kruger (1999) have demonstrated that anchoring-like effects are magnified under cognitive load. These studies also showed that cognitive load affects the adjustment process, rather than the degree of focus on the anchor. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) proposed a third explanation based on selective accessibility that is semantically primed by an anchor, which applies when an individual is uncertain about the estimated value and the anchor is within the plausible range. They distinguish among three anchoring effects. First, if the individual knows with certainty the value in question (e.g., his or her age), then no anchoring effect will occur. Second, when the individual has only generic categorical knowledge regarding the value and the anchor is implausible, then anchoring may occur in the form of an adjustment that terminates at the nearest boundary of the acceptable value range (as discussed above).
The third case, which Strack and Mussweiler (1997) studied, occurs when the individual has generic category knowledge and the anchor is within the plausible range. In this case, Strack and Mussweiler propose that people construct a mental model that selectively increases the accessibility of anchor-consistent information, assuming the anchor is relevant to the estimated value. For example, they show that information (e.g., the height of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin) that is accessible but inapplicable to the feature to be judged (e.g., the width of the Brandenburg Gate) produces a weaker anchoring effect than if the anchor and judged feature relate to the same aspect.
The effect of an anchor on consumers' willingness-to-pay judgments (see, e.g., Ariely et al. in press; Green et al. 1998 ) depends on the factors consumers consider when making purchase decisions or other choices. In general, most products come in different varieties, have different features, are associated with different brands and countries of origin, and are sold at different stores. Thus, once consumers decide to make a purchase in a product category (e.g., buy a food processor), they still need to decide on the particular item and, correspondingly, the price they are willing to pay. The question consumers need to answer is what combination of item characteristics and price offers the best (or satisficing) solution, given consumers' values or utility functions. This can be a challenging task, particularly considering that preferences and values are often ill-defined and unstable (e.g., Bettman et al. 1998; Simonson 1993) .
Suppose, now, that a consumer is asked to consider an arbitrary anchor, such as whether to pay $20 for a food processor with a certain set of features. Since $20 is clearly a low price for a food processor, the consumer will likely be willing to pay that price.
Next, the consumer is asked about the highest price he or she would be willing to pay for the food processor. Consistent with the evidence reviewed above, such a WTP judgment is expected to be influenced by the provided anchor, generating prices that are skewed in the direction of the low anchor. Conversely, if the anchor were $80, we would expect the consumer to have higher WTP for that food processor.
The combination of having many different options to choose from and the instability and fuzziness of consumer preferences makes WTP judgments particularly susceptible to influence by anchors that relate directly to the product price, even if the anchors are outside the plausible range (e.g., Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; Urbany et al. 1988) . Consider now the effect of anchors on consumers' WTA judgments. For example, suppose that a consumer received as a gift a new food processor, which he does not need and wishes to sell. Suppose further that some arbitrary number is generated as a possible selling price. The question then is whether such WTA judgments will be as susceptible to influence by arbitrary price anchors as WTP judgments are expected to be.
When deciding on a selling price, the focal question relates to the price the consumer can obtain for the specific item being sold. The answer depends primarily on the demand and the market prices for such an item. That is, once the decision to sell has been made, the consumer's own values and tastes become less relevant. As argued above, the fact that the consumer's values and tastes are often ill-defined and unstable makes WTP judgments particularly susceptible to influence by arbitrary anchors. Conversely, although consumers may not know what the going market price for an item is, they are likely to rely on prior knowledge (e.g., food processor prices encountered in the past) to derive an estimate. For example, a consumer who has observed in the past that food processor prices range between $50 and $150 may determine that the one that he wants to sell is closer to the high end in terms of features and price it accordingly, possibly offering some discount to attract buyers. Thus, determining a selling price is likely to involve an estimate of relevant market reference prices, such as the price of the same item at the store, which might be modified based any sales tactic the seller wants to apply (e.g., offering a 20% discount relative to the typical store price). Importantly, as discussed further below, this analysis does not mean that selling prices are immune to anchoring effects, particularly if these effects are applied to the perceived market prices on which sellers rely when setting their prices.
Thus, we propose that WTA judgments are less susceptible than WTP judgments to anchoring effects that are applied directly to the selling/purchase prices, for two reasons. First, as indicated, selling prices are dependent primarily on perceived market prices and are much less dependent on fuzzy, unstable values and tastes. Therefore, asking consumers whether they would sell a product at a certain arbitrary price will have a limited effect, because consumers are likely to rely on their perception of what buyers will pay. Second, unlike purchase decisions where the set of items that might be purchased is unbounded (e.g., different feature-price combinations, stores, and brands), selling decisions typically relate to a particular item that the consumer happens to own and wishes to sell. In other words, selling decisions are simpler than buying decisions, because the item that is the focus of the (sale) transaction is usually predetermined, and the only remaining issue is the best price that one can obtain for a given level of effort (e.g., Kivetz 2002 ).
The analysis of the effect of arbitrary anchors on WTP further suggests that such effects might be reduced if consumers are given other, more relevant anchors to rely on.
One option is to ask consumers to explain first how they would decide on the maximum price they are willing to pay. Once consumers commit to a particular methodology for deriving a WTP judgment, it is reasonable to expect that this method will be applied, making the WTP judgment less susceptible to influence by arbitrary anchors. Conversely, if minimum selling prices (i.e., WTA judgments) are less susceptible to influence by arbitrary anchors, the effect of explaining how selling prices are derived, if any, is likely to be small.
A second way in which anchoring effects on WTP judgments might be reduced is by creating a salient reference price, which is likely to loom large in subsequent WTP judgments. Specifically, suppose that consumers are first asked to estimate the typical store price for an item and are then told to state their reservation price for that item. Such a procedure creates an external reference price or anchor that is likely to diminish the impact of any arbitrary anchor on WTP judgments. Conversely, if, as we assume, consumers tend to consider market prices spontaneously when making WTA judgments, then an explicit instruction to do so should not have a significant effect on selling prices.
In study 1 we test the basic proposition that purchase prices are more susceptible to influence by arbitrary price anchors than selling prices. We also test the effect of asking consumers to explain how they make WTP and WTA judgments and of estimating the typical market price for each product prior to making such judgments.
STUDY 1
Respondents were shown four products and asked to enter the highest [lowest] price at which they would be willing to purchase [sell] each product. The effect of an arbitrary anchor on WTP [WTA] was tested by asking respondents to consider first the last two digits of their social security number (SSN) as a possible purchase [selling] price. In addition, some respondents were first asked to explain how they would decide on a purchase/selling prices. Other respondents were told to estimate the typical store price for each item. Another respondent group just made WTP [WTA] judgments, without entering or considering their SSN as a possible price.
Method
The respondents were 287 undergraduate students at a West Coast university.
They were randomly assigned to one of eight tasks: (1) willingness-to-pay (WTP) without a social security number (SSN) anchor; (2) willingness-to-accept (WTA) without a SSN anchor; (3) WTP with a SSN anchor; (4) WTA with a SSN anchor; (5) WTP with a SSN anchor preceded by an articulation of the basis for WTP (hereafter, the WTP method articulation group); (6) WTA with a SSN anchor preceded by articulation of the basis for WTA (hereafter, the WTA method articulation group); (7) WTP with SSN anchor, preceded by estimation of the typical store price for the product; and (8) WTA with SSN anchor, preceded by estimation of the typical store price.
Respondents in the WTP conditions were informed in the introductory instructions that they would be asked to indicate the amount they would be willing to pay for each product. The instructions emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers.
They were then shown four products in the following order: toaster, cordless phone, backpack, and headphone radio. The picture of each product was presented along with a brief description (for an example of the WTP with a SSN anchor task, see figure 1). In the "simple WTP" task, respondents were asked, "What is the highest price you would be willing to pay for this [toaster] ?" Respondents in the "WTP with a SSN" task were told (after reading the product description) to enter the last two digits of their SSN. Next, they answered the following two questions: 1) "Now assume that the last two digits of your SSN are a price in dollars.
Would you be willing to pay this price for this [toaster] ? Yes or No?"; and 2) "What is the highest price you would be willing to pay for this [toaster] ?"
The WTP method articulation task was similar to the "WTP with a SSN" task, except that, before entering the last two digits of their SSN, respondents were asked: "Suppose you were considering buying this [toaster] . How, or on what basis, would you decide about the highest price you would be willing to pay for this [toaster] ?"
In the "WTP with SSN and expected store price" task, respondents were asked, before entering the last two digits of their SSN, the following question: "How much would you expect such a [toaster] to cost in a typical store?"
Respondents in the WTA conditions were asked to assume that they received new products as gifts and were planning to sell them. Their task was to indicate the price at which they would be willing to sell each product. The specific task instructions paralleled those in the corresponding WTP groups. For example, in the WTA with a SSN anchor group, for each of the four products, respondents entered the last two digits of their social security number and answered the following questions: 1) "Now assume that the last two WTP/WTA judgment responses (e.g., 0, ∞ ), we transformed the data of study 1 (and the subsequent studies) with the windsor procedure (Barnett and Lewis 1978) . In particular, the bottom 5% and top 5% of the data values were replaced with the value of the cut-off (95-percentile) criterion. This commonly used procedure allowed us to control for outliers, while utilizing all of the information in the data set. Table 1 shows the median prices of the four products in each task.
We first tested the anchoring effect on WTP and WTA prices using ANOVA, with the maximum purchase/minimum selling price as dependent variable, and SSN (as a continuous variable), task (WTP vs. WTA), the interaction of SSN and task, and three category dummy variables as independent variables. As predicted, there was a statistically significant interaction (t = 2.3, p < .01) 1 between the task and SSN, such that the effect of SSN on WTP was significantly stronger. Pooling across the four products, the average median WTP of those whose last two SSN digits were less than 50 was $11
lower than the WTP of those whose last two digits were 50 through 99. Conversely, the corresponding difference for WTA (selling) prices was -$2.5. To examine the effect of articulating a method for deriving WTP/WTA judgments, we added to the model the main effect of pricing method articulation, the twoway interactions between pricing method articulation and the WTP vs. WTA task and between pricing method articulation and SSN, as well as the three-way interaction. As expected, the three-way interaction was statistically significant and indicated that the effect of the SSN anchor on WTP was significantly weaker among those in the pricing method articulation group (t = 1.8, p < .04, one-tailed test). Simple effects analysis confirms that the interactive effect of the pricing method articulation and SSN is significant for WTP judgments (t = 2.9, p, < .01, one-tailed test) but not for WTA judgments (t = .01, n.s.). As shown in table 1, the median anchoring effect in this group (i.e., the average difference between median WTP of those whose SSN is 0-49 versus 50-99) was $2.5, compared to $11 in the group that was not asked to explain how they determined the price.
To examine the effect of estimating the typical store price for each product, we added to the basic model the main effect of this task, the two-way interactions between estimating store price and the WTP vs. WTA task and between estimating store price and SSN, as well as the three-way interaction. Contrary to our prediction, the three-way interaction was not statistically significant (t = 1.1, p > .13). Although the anchoring effect among those who indicated the expected store price tended to be smaller than among those who did not enter the typical store price (across the four categories, $5 vs.
$11; see Table 1 ), the difference was not statistically significant. The two-way interaction between entering expected store price and the WTP/WTA task was statistically significant (t = 1.9, p <.05).
Discussion and Follow-up Studies
The results of study 1 support our basic prediction that WTP judgments are more susceptible to influence by arbitrary price anchors than WTA judgments, which depend on estimates of market prices. Furthermore, the results suggest that the effect of an arbitrary anchor on WTP can be decreased by instructing respondents to first articulate the basis on which they would set the maximum purchase price. We also expected that asking respondents to estimate the product price at a typical store would diminish the impact of the arbitrary anchor. However, although the effect was in the expected direction, it was not statistically significant.
In a follow-up study with 220 student participants, we asked respondents to provide an explanation for each maximum purchase price or minimum selling price they entered. The explanations were coded by two independent judges who were blind to the research hypotheses. The different response categories were further classified as focusing on the needs and values of the buyer/seller, the market value of the item or what others would pay, and other explanations. The needs and values of the buyer/seller referred to aspects such as how much the respondent actually needed that item, his or her budget, the usefulness of the specific product features for that respondent, and how often the item would be used by the respondent. On the other hand, explanations coded as reflecting assessments of market value or the value of the item to others included, for example, how much others would be willing to pay, the typical market price, whether the price was fair or reasonable given going market prices, and assessments of whether others were likely to find the product attractive and useful.
Among those who made WTP judgments, 37.5% of the explanations focused on the needs and values of the respondents and 43% referred to the market value of the items. Conversely, among those who made WTA judgments, only 15% relied on their needs and values of the respondents whereas 58% explained their minimum selling prices based on market prices and others' WTP. These results support our assumption that WTP judgments are relatively more dependent on assessment of one's own values whereas WTA judgments rely primarily on assessments of market prices that are used as reference points and attenuate the effect of arbitrary anchors on selling prices.
We conducted a second follow-up study with 246 student participants to test an alternative explanation for the observed effect of arbitrary anchors on WTP judgments, whereby such effects reflect the impact of people's limited cognitive capacity (e.g., WTA), SSN, and time pressure did not reach statistical significance (p < .12). Overall, these results do not support the notion that the effect of an arbitrary anchor on WTP judgments merely reflects the impact of limited cognitive resources, considering that neither cognitive load nor time pressure exacerbate (and time pressure might even attenuate) the observed anchoring effect. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that, for such an anchoring effect to occur, consumers must have the cognitive resources needed for processing the anchors as candidate prices.
STUDY 2
We proposed that anchoring effects on WTP judgments are due to the wide variety of options one might select and the fuzziness and uncertainty of the consumer's values. These factors are less significant with respect to WTA prices, which have a natural external anchor -the estimated market price. Although estimates of typical market prices are also susceptible to manipulation (see study 3), the fact that market prices are considered adds "noise" and thus masks the direct effect of an arbitrary anchor on WTA judgments. One way to test the proposition that value uncertainty contributes to the observed anchoring effect on WTP judgments is by examining the effect of making value uncertainty more salient in the context of WTA judgments. That is, if value uncertainty makes consumers more susceptible to the influence of irrelevant anchors when making WTP judgments, then making value uncertainty more salient in the context of WTA judgments should enhance their susceptibility to anchoring effects as well. This prediction was tested in study 2.
In this study we introduced two new conditions. In addition to testing again the effect of an irrelevant anchor (i.e., the last two digits of the respondent's social security number) on WTP and WTA judgments, we tested the effect of making value uncertainty salient. We did not expect that the manipulation of making value uncertainty salient would have a significant effect on WTP judgments, because we assume that value uncertainty affects such judgments even without making it salient. However, consistent with the assumption that value uncertainty makes pricing judgments more susceptible to influence by irrelevant factors, we expected to observe an anchoring effect on minimum selling prices as well when the uncertainty about the value of the items to the consumer (i.e., the seller) is made salient.
Method
The study participants were 165 undergraduate students at a West Coast university. The respondents were randomly assigned to one of four tasks: WTP, WTA, WTP with salient value uncertainty, and WTA with salient value uncertainty. The WTP and WTA tasks were identical to the tasks used in studies 1 and 2, where respondents entered the last two digits of their social security number, indicated whether they would buy [sell] the item at that price, and then entered their maximum [minimum] purchase
[selling] price.
In the salient value uncertainty conditions, the introductory instructions and each problem highlighted the uncertainty about whether and at what price the items should be purchased/sold. For example, the introductory instruction in the WTA -value uncertainty task stated, "Assume also that you are considering selling these products, though you may also keep the product." Then, as shown in figure 2 , the uncertainty about whether to sell and about the personal value of the item was made salient by adding the following underlined sentence (just before considering the SSN as a possible price): "Assume you are not sure if you want to sell the toaster, and if so, at what price you would be willing to sell it." The same four problems used in study 1 -toaster, backpack, cordless phone, and headphones -were included in study 2.
----------------------------------------

Insert figure 2 about here ----------------------------------------
Results
As in study 1, to adjust for extreme values, we windsorized the data (Barnett and Lewis 1978) . As shown in table 2 and consistent with the results of study 1, the SSN anchor had a large effect on WTP judgments (the average difference between median prices was $15) but had virtually no effect on WTA judgments (approximately zero difference between SSN groups). An ANOVA, with the task and (continuous) SSN as main effects and the interaction between the two (as well as product category dummy variables) indicated that the interaction was statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction (t = 2.4, p < .01, one-tail test).
As expected, the three-way interaction between (continuous) SSN, WTP vs.
WTA, and the value uncertainty condition was statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction (t = 1.8, p < .04, one-tail test). When the uncertainty about the value of items was made salient, the median WTA judgments (i.e., minimum selling prices) were, on average, $10 greater among those in the higher SSN group, compared to $-1 in the WTA group without salient value uncertainty. Thus, as was predicted, WTA judgments were influenced by the SSN anchor when respondents considered the uncertainty about the values of the items to them. In the WTP groups, the average effect of the SSN anchor tended to be smaller ($5) when the uncertainty about the items' values was made salient.
In summary, study 2 provides additional support for the notion that focusing on the personal values of items to be purchased or sold, which are inherently uncertain and often malleable, makes WTP as well as WTA judgments susceptible to influence by irrelevant anchors. Indeed, making salient the uncertainty of the values of the items to be sold led to a significant anchoring effect on WTA judgments, similar to the observed anchoring effect on WTP judgments.
STUDY 3
We suggested that selling prices are less susceptible to influence by arbitrary price anchors because consumers tend to rely on market prices. That is, when asked if they would sell an item at a certain price (e.g., the last two digits of their SSN), consumers refer to their perception of what the "market will bear" (for instance, based on market prices of new items and the condition of the item to be sold). Thus, the impact of considering an anchor selling price is masked and diminished due to the reliance on another variable, market price. This, however, does not mean that perceived market prices are necessarily well-defined and cannot be manipulated. In fact, it is reasonable to expect that an anchoring effect that is applied directly to market prices can influence the perceived market prices just as price anchors affect WTP and other judgments.
Furthermore, if indeed WTA (selling) prices are driven by perceived market prices, then any systematic manipulation of consumers' perceptions of these prices should, in turn, affect minimum selling prices. In other words, the anchoring effect can operate indirectly by influencing the factor that drives WTA judgments. We tested this prediction in study 3. The effect of manipulated perceived market prices on WTP judgments is less clear. On the one hand, assuming that WTP prices are based primarily on the perceived value of the item to the consumer, rather than perceived market prices, an anchoring effect on perceived market prices should not lead to an anchoring effect on WTP judgments. On the other hand, asking respondents to predict market prices is likely to make these prices salient when deciding on maximum purchase prices, even if they play a relatively smaller role when making WTP judgments. We tested these predictions in study 3.
Method
The respondents were 168 undergraduate students at two West Coast universities and employees at a large Midwestern insurance company, who were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) WTP with estimated market price, (2) WTA with estimated market price (see figure 3) , (3) WTP with provided list price, and (4) WTA with provided list price. As illustrated in figure 3 , the anchoring manipulation used in studies 1 and 2 was applied to respondents' estimates of the typical store price (in conditions 1-2), followed by a question about the lowest [highest] price they would be willing to accept
[pay] for the item.
To make the control conditions (conditions 3-4) comparable to the groups in which the anchoring manipulation was applied to the estimated store prices, it was necessary to provide the latter groups with a reference market price as well (that was not subject to an anchoring manipulation). Accordingly, we informed the respondents in these groups of the "list price" of the item, while making it clear that actual store prices may be lower (for example, "The list price of this toaster is $39, but actual store prices may be lower"). Thus, although respondents in these groups had a reference price, they still needed to decide on their WTP/WTA. The provided list prices were significantly higher than the median typical store prices indicated by respondents in the corresponding conditions of study 1. Respondents evaluated the same four problems as in studies 1-2.
Results
As in studies 1 and 2, we windsorized the data (Barnett and Lewis 1978) to adjust for extreme values. Tables 3 and 4 present the median WTP and WTA prices and the median estimated store prices (in the two conditions in which typical store prices were estimated), respectively. The anchoring manipulation had the expected effect on estimated typical store prices, with SSN having a positive effect in both the WTP (t = 1.6, p <.05, one-tailed test) and WTA groups (t = 5.5, p < .01, one-tailed test).
Insert tables 3 and 4 about here
Consistent with the results of studies 1-2, an analysis of the maximum purchase prices and minimum selling prices in the basic WTP and WTA groups (with provided list prices) finds an interaction effect between SSN and the condition (t = 1.7, p < .05).
Simple effects analysis shows a significant effect of the SSN anchor for WTP judgments (t = 2.6, p < .01) but not for WTA judgments (t = 0.6, p < .53).
To examine the moderating effect of the estimated market price, we added to the model the main effect of the price estimation task, the two-way interactions of the price estimate task with SSN and with the WTP vs. WTA task, as well as the three-way interaction. As expected, there was a statistically significant three-way interaction (t = 2.3, p < .01, one-tail test), indicating that SSN was a significant predictor of WTA prices among those who first estimated typical store prices (t = 3.8, p < .01) but not among those who did not (t = .7, p < .48; difference is statistically significant t = 2.0, p < .05).
Conversely, the store price estimate task did not significantly moderate the effect of SSN on WTP judgments (t = 1.5, p > .2). Thus, the SSN anchor can affect WTA judgments, if the manipulation is applied to estimated market prices, which, in turn, affect the indicated minimum selling prices.
Indeed, further analysis shows that the effect of the SSN on WTA judgments was mediated by participants' actual judgments of store prices. To test for mediation, we ran a series of regressions which showed (for participants in the WTA with the store price estimate task) a significant effect of the SSN anchor on WTA judgments (beta = .24, t = 3.77, p < .01), a significant effect of the SSN anchor on store price judgments (beta = .27, t = 4.25, p < .01), and a significant effect of the store price judgments on WTA judgments (beta = .83, t = 20.2, p < .01). Further, the effect of the SSN anchor on WTA judgments becomes insignificant (beta = .02, t = .4, p < .69) when the (significant) effect of store price judgments is included in the model (beta = .83, t = 19.0, p < .01).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Value-based pricing can be examined from both the buyer's and the seller's perspective. The buyer needs to decide whether a particular product offers a good value given that consumer's preferences and the other available options. The seller of a single item, on the other hand, has to evaluate whether a buyer will purchase the product at a given price (and sellers of multiple items may try to estimate the demand curve). Thus, the buyer and seller's problem are asymmetric, because the buyer needs to assess both his or her values and the going market prices whereas the seller, who has already decided to sell the item, only needs to evaluate what buyers will be willing to pay. In this research we contrasted the implications of this asymmetry with respect to the susceptibility of purchase and selling prices to influence by arbitrary anchors.
In a series of studies, we showed that willingness-to-pay, but not willingness-toaccept, judgments are significantly influenced by an arbitrary anchor (the last two digits of the person's SSN) that is considered as a possible purchase/selling price. On the other hand, WTA is sensitive to a similar anchoring manipulation if that manipulation is applied to the perceived market price. These findings suggest that consumers are most susceptible to influence by arbitrary anchors on the dimensions relied upon for making the target judgment. Conversely, if consumers naturally rely on one dimension for making a judgment (e.g., the highest/lowest purchase/selling price) and the anchor is applied to another dimension, the magnitude of the anchoring effect, if any, is likely to be small.
These findings build on and extend prior research on the anchoring effect and the conditions under which it is observed. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) showed that there is a diminishing assimilation effect for anchor values associated with a dimension other than the target dimension. For example, an anchor relating to the length of the Mississippi River has a significantly weaker effect on judgments about the width of the river than about its length. Strack and Mussweiler interpreted this finding as evidence that the anchoring effect depends on how applicable the activated information is perceived to be.
Specifically, it suggests that the effect operates not merely by activating a numerical value, but by activating a value that is used to compare the target with the anchor value.
Strack and Mussweiler further proposed that people test the possibility that the target possesses the anchor value and try to construct a mental model that includes information that is most consistent with the anchor value.
The findings of this research are consistent with the conclusion that the anchoring effect operates by activating a value that, if seen as applicable, is used as a reference point. However, it is not at all clear that the impact of anchors on purchase or selling prices involves the construction of mental models that are most consistent with the anchor. Rather, consistent with a great deal of research indicating that consumers tend to have a range of acceptable prices (e.g., Cox 1986; Monroe and Petroshius 1981; Ofir 2002) , the findings of this research support the notion that, to the extent that an anchor is applicable, consumers adjust their judgment from that anchor and terminate close to the nearest boundary of the acceptable price range. Thus, our results are most consistent with a process that combines the semantic priming explanation of Strack and Mussweiler and the anchoring and adjustment process first proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) .
The present research is among the first to study influences on consumer decisions regarding selling prices. The findings demonstrate the importance of understanding the manner in which consumers estimate market prices in determining selling prices. If consumers know with certainty the market price of the item they wish to sell, then this natural reference point is likely to loom large in any decision about the selling price.
Even in this case, interesting questions that deserve further study arise with respect to the factors that affect the discount level that a consumer, who is an occasional seller, applies to the known market price. It might be important, for example, to try to understand the criteria and the types of lay-person psychological analyses that consumers employ when setting the selling price to other consumers and whether their considerations differ significantly from those used by manufacturers (for a related discussion, see Friestad and Wright 1994) .
In many other situations, the seller may have to estimate the typical market price for an item similar in its characteristics and condition to the item they wish to sell. In this case, it would be important to understand the cues for market prices that amateur sellers rely on when assessing likely and/or reasonable market prices. Furthermore, whether or not the market price is known, when setting the selling price, consumers may often be uncertain whether they wish to sell the item at issue. As shown in study 2, higher uncertainty as to whether the consumer wants to sell the item at issue makes the WTA judgment more susceptible to influence by arbitrary anchors.
The interaction between uncertainty about the value of the item to the seller and the perceived market value of the item to other consumers may make the determination of selling prices more complex and susceptible to various framing and priming effects. In general, one might expect that higher uncertainty about the value of the item to the seller will result in higher minimum selling prices, holding the perceived market price constant, but this intuition needs to be empirically tested.
In summary, the present research highlights the susceptibility of consumers price judgments to irrelevant influences. These findings suggest that, instead of relying on a more "passive" approach of estimating the value of a product to target consumers and setting the price accordingly, marketers can adopt a more active role based on an analysis of the factors that influence consumers' price judgments. Of course, we are not suggesting that marketers should generate arbitrary anchors and use them to enhance consumers' WTP. However, from both a theoretical and practical perspectives, it is important to recognize the degree to which willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept judgments are dependent on seemingly irrelevant anchors (e.g., what someone else paid for a different product) that are present in the consumer environment. First, please enter the last two digits of your social security number (SSN): ______ 1. Now assume that the last two digits of your SSN are a price in dollars. Would you be willing to pay this price for this toaster (circle one)?
YES NO
2. What is the highest price you would be willing to pay for this toaster? $________ Assume now that the last two digits of your SSN are a price in dollars. Would you be willing to sell this toaster at this price (circle one)?
2. What is the lowest price you would be willing to sell this toaster for? $_______ First, please enter the last two digits of your social security number (SSN): ______ 1. Now assume that the last two digits of your SSN are a price in dollars. In your assessment, is the typical store price of this toaster higher or lower than this price?
HIGHER LOWER
2. What is your best estimate of the typical store price of this toaster? $_______ 3. What is the highest price that you would be willing to pay for this toaster? $________ $34.4 $39.5 $32.5 $37.5 $38.5 $34.4 $21.8 $32.5 * A total of 168 respondents participated in the study. 
Average
